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Doug Jessop Construction, Inc.,
dba Sage Builders,
Petitioner and Appellee,

ORDER

Case No. 20060979-CA

v.
Joseph D. Anderton and Prime
Time Marketing Services, Inc.,
Respondents and Appellants

Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.
This matter is before the court on Appellee's motion to
strike portions of Appellant's reply brief. Appellee contends
that various assignments of error and arguments contained in the
reply brief fail to comply with rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
The court has reviewed the briefs and has determined that
the majority of the arguments at issue here were not improperly
raised as an issue for the first time in Appellant's reply brief.
However, the court agrees with Appellee that the issue of
whether "the [district] court . . . erred in including Mr.
Anderton, in his individual capacity, in the proceedings below,"
was raised for the first time in the reply brief. This court
generally declines to consider matters raised for the first time
in the reply brief. Beacham v. Fritzi Realty Corp., 2006 UT App
35,56,11.1, 131 P.3d 271. Because this particular argument was
not raised in the opening brief or in response to a "new matter
set forth in the opposing brief," this court will not consider
it. See Mi Vida Enters, v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App 400, 113,
n.3, 122 P.3d 144 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(c)).
In addition, the court notes that each side has requested
the opportunity to provide supplemental authority based upon a
recently issued decision. Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides specific instruction on the manner
by which supplemental authority shall be provided to the court.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that motion to strike is
granted in part and denied in part. The argument that the
district court erred "in including Mr. Anderton, in his
individual capacity, in the proceedings below," shall be stricken
from the reply brief. The remainder of the reply brief shall be
considered by the court.
DATED this ( I

day of September, 2007.

FOR THE COURT:

Greg<5ry K. Orme, Judge
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I.

SUMMARY.
The central issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that

the Notice of Interest and the two subsequent notices of lis pendens filed by Respondent,
Appellant Prime Time Marketing Services, Inc. ("Prime Time"), by and through its
corporate officer Respondent, Appellant Joseph D. Anderton ("Mr. Anderton"), were
wrongful liens under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-102. Petitioner, Appellee, Doug Jessop
Construction, Inc., d.b.a. Sage Builders ("Sage") attempts to shift focus away from this
central issue and, instead, devotes much of its Opposition Brief to arguing that Prime
Time and Mr. Anderton failed to preserve the issues for appeal. (Brief of Appellee Doug
Jessop Construction, Inc., d.b.a. Sage Builders ("Opposition Brief), filed May, 14, 2007,
pp. 15-16, 23, 27-31.) As set forth below, however, Prime Time and Mr. Anderton
properly preserved each of these issues for appeal despite the summary nature of the
proceedings below.
Returning to the central issue, Sage argues that the Notice of Interest and the two
lis pendens filed in this action were filed in violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien
Injunctions Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-101, et seq., and, therefore, were subject to
summary nullification. (Opposition Brief, pp. 23-25, 32-45.) However, because these
filings were made pursuant to a legitimate dispute over entitlement to certain real
property (the "Property"), were specifically authorized by statute, and were not made in
violation of the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act, they are not "wrongful liens," as defined
by the Act. As a result, the trial court committed error by nullifying them.

The district court erred in nullifying the Notice of Interest and the two lis pendens
because doing so required the district court to determine the underlying merits of an
acknowledged dispute between Sage and Prime Time. This is directly contrary to the
legislative intent of the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act, as exhibited by the requirements
and limitations of the Act itself. The Act, with its summary procedures, was clearly
intended to address only "baseless liens5' and not those predicated on actual, good faith
disputes between the parties. The district court committed error when it failed to follow
those summary procedures, which culminated in it issuing a vague and ambiguous order
which inexplicably swept up Appellant Mr. Anderton, who was not a party to the
underlying property dispute. This led to the initial impermissible nullification of the
Notice of Interest and the First Notice of Lis Pendens.1
Moreover, the trial court, while considering the merits of the underlying property
dispute in its initial ruling, inexplicably declined to properly address the merits of the
parties' dispute when it dismissed the Counterclaim filed by the Appellant Prime Time;
that dismissal, in turn, led the district court to hold that the First Notice of Lis Pendens
was improperly filed because it was not filed as a corollary to the filing of any claim.
As is evident from a review of the record in this matter, this dispute spiraled out of
control at the trial court level. First, the district court issued an wrongful lien injunction
without the necessary finding that Sage had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the filings in question were "wrongful liens" under the terms of the Wrongful Lien
Injunctions Act. [R. at 969.] Then, on the basis of that injunction, the trial court
removed the Second Notice of Lis Pendens, which it had specifically authorized Prime
Time to file. [R. at 970, p. 15-21.] Finally, the trial court held Mr. Anderton, personally,
in contempt of court for the actions of Prime Time in following the court's suggestion to
file that Second Notice of Lis Pendens. [R. at 971.] This contempt finding resulted in
Mr. Anderton being jailed.
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The dismissal of the Counterclaim and First Notice of Lis Pendens was error and contrary
to the intended scope of the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act.
Further, with regard to the Second Notice of Lis Pendens filed by Prime Time, at
the hearing on August 11, 2006, the district court, with Sage's concurrence and
predicated upon the dismissal of the Counterclaim, expressly authorized the filing, by
Prime Time, of a second action between the parties for "whatever relief and "without
prejudice." [R. at 969, pp. 31-32, 34-35, 55-58.] Yet when Prime Time did exactly that,
filed a new action in which it asserted the merits of its Counterclaim, along with a
corollary Second Notice of Lis Pendens, the district court then determined that the filing
of the Second Notice of Lis Pendens violated its previous order prohibiting the filing of
further "wrongful liens." [R. at 970, pp. 15-21.] This was cleetr error.
Because the district court erred in nullifying the Notice of Interest and the two lis
pendens and in dismissing the Counterclaim, this Court should reverse the holdings of the
trial court and reverse the trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to Sage.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE SCOPE AND
REQUIREMENTS OF THE WRONGFUL LIEN ACT, WHICH LED TO
THE IMPROPER NULLIFICATION OF THE NOTICE OF INTEREST AS
WELL AS THE TWO LIS PENDENS.
Sage's arguments that the Notice of Interest and lis pendens were properly

nullified is based on an argument regarding the legislative intent and the intended scope
of the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act. (Opposition Brief, pp. 46-47.) Sage argues, both
below and before this Court, that the intended scope and legislative intent of the
Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act is significantly broad so as to effectively allow a trial
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court to decide, ex parte, issues of disputed property interest. (Opposition Brief, pp. 3637.) That is contrary to the face of the statute which sets forth detailed procedures and
places limitations on the scope of the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act, both of which are
clear expressions of legislative intent and contrary to the trial court's rulings.
A.

The Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act is Designed to Nullify Only
Baseless Liens.

The Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act is designed for the narrow purpose of
removing "wrongful liens" in circumstances where there is no dispute regarding title and
possession of property and where the party recording the "wrongful lien" has no
reasonable basis to claim an interest in the property. Essentially, the Wrongful Lien
Injunctions Act is designed to nullify only baseless liens, as evidenced by the fact that the
Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act defines "wrongful lien" narrowly. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Wilshire, 123 P.3d 393, 2005 UT 59, ^ 10 (interpreting the parallel Wrongful Liens and
Wrongful Judgment Liens statute).

Sage further argues that if a party could file a lis pendens in response to a petition
to nullify a wrongful lien, the purpose of the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act would be
eviscerated. (Opposition Brief, pp. 25.) This argument ignores the fact that the
legislature has set out mechanisms for parties who claim an interest in property to protect
that interest by filing a notice of interest or a lis pendens. (Brief of Respondents and
Appellants [sic] Joseph D. Anderton and Prime Time Marketing Services, Inc.
("Appellants' Brief), pp. 35-37, 44-46.)
Furthermore, the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act is limited in scope to removing
only liens. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-201. As set forth in Appellants' Brief, the Notice of
Interest and lis pendens were not "liens" as defined by the Act. (Appellants' Brief, pp.
19-23, 44-45.) Sage cites no Utah law to suggest otherwise. (Opposition Brief, pp. 3340.) Instead, Sage relies on Utah cases which have not specifically decided this issue.
(Id.) These cases, however, do not support Sage's arguments.

4

Under the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act, the injured party is cast in terms of
being the "victim." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-201(l)(a). "Victim5'implies mistreatment
to, and to victimize means to subject to deception and fraud. "Victim" is not a word
which applies when the parties have a genuine dispute. The term "wrongful" has a
similar connotation of something that is characterized by unfairness, injustice, or is
contrary to law. Clearly, these are not the words framing a legitimate controversy.
That the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act was intended to address only the most
baseless of liens is further evidenced by the procedure of the Act, and by the fact that, at
the injunction hearing to determine whether there is a "wrongful lien," "[t]he burden is on
the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has made,
uttered, recorded or filed a wrongful lien..." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-203(2). As set
forth in the statute, the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act provides a very narrow remedy for
circumstances where the party filing a lien has no basis to do so. This is not the case
where, as here, the party moving for an injunction admits that there is a genuine
controversy regarding the property.
Consistent with this intent, the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act is not designed to
remove property filings that are statutorily authorized, such as the Notice of Interest and
the two lis pendens. The lower court erred in nullifying the Notice of Interest and the two
lis pendens because the parties have a legitimate dispute regarding the disposition of title
to, and possession of, the Property and because the filings made by Prime Time were
authorized by statute.

5

B.

Sage Acknowledges That the Parties Have a Genuine Dispute
Regarding the Property.

Notably, Sage admits in its Opposition Brief that the parties have a genuine
dispute regarding the Property. (Opposition Brief, p. 4.) In fact, Sage has admitted
throughout the proceedings on appeal and below that the parties dispute the proper
disposition of the Property. For example, on June 28, 2006, Sage filed a Petition for Civil
Wrongful Lien Injunction & Request for Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction (the
"Petition"), which acknowledged that the parties had a dispute over the Property. [R. at
1-28.] Sage's Petition makes clear that Prime Time asserted an interest in the Property
and that Sage disputed that interest. [Id. at p. 2] Further, Sage asserted in the district
court that "[t]he sale of the Property did not go through for reasons disputed by the
parties." [R. at 48 and 446.] Most telling, Sage admits that it has refused any attempt by
Prime Time to elect a remedy for Sage's breach of the REPC and that it refused to refund
Prime Time's earnest money, which was paid to secure its interest in the Property. [R. at
969, p. 34; (Opposition Brief, pp. 4, 8).] Prime Time and Mr. Anderton's Answer to
Petition and Verified Counterclaim further establish that the parties dispute whether the
Notice of Interest and lis pendens were proper. [R. at 87-95.]
Because the parties have a genuine dispute regarding the disposition of the
Property, the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act is not applicable. The Wrongful Lien
Injunctions Act was designed for the limited purpose of nullifying "wrongful liens" as
defined above. Contested matters are outside of the parameters of the Wrongful Lien
Injunctions Act. That is why the petitioner in such an action is charged with the burden
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of showing, "by a preponderance of the evidence/' that a "wrongful lien" has been
recorded. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-203. Filings that are authorized by statute, or that are
made with a "reasonable basis" of belief that the filing party has an interest in the
Property are exempt from the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1
and § 76-6-503.5. The Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act was designed to nullify only the
most baseless liens in circumstances where the filing party has no basis upon which to
believe that he holds an interest in the subject property. Given that the parties here
acknowledge both a dispute over the Property and the execution of a valid REPC for the
sale of the Property, it was an error for the lower court to nullify the Notice of Interest
and the lis pendens.
C.

The District Court Erred in Entering the Wrongful Lien Injunction
Because Sage's Petition Was Both Deficient and Unclear.

Because the remedy provided by the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act is so
extraordinary, the requirements for obtaining that relief are particular and must be met
precisely. A petition for a civil wrongful lien injunction must include "the specific
actions and dates of the actions constituting the alleged wrongful lien." Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-9a-202(c). Further, the petition must specifically identify the party that filed the
allegedly "wrongful" lien. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-202(b). Most importantly, the
petition must include "corroborating evidence of a wrongful lien..." Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-9a-202(e). The forms adopted by the Administrative Office of the Courts support
this language by requiring the moving party to attach to the petition a copy of the alleged
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"wrongful lien." [R. at 151-153, p. 2.] Further, the adopted forms provide that a civil
lien injunction shall contain the following language:
The Respondent is enjoined from making, uttering, recording, or filing any
further liens without specific permission from the court.
The lien referenced in the Petition, a copy of which is attached to this
Order, is nullified.
[R. at 156 (emphasis added).]
The lower court's Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction and subsequent Order
Dissolving Temporary Restraining Order [sic] and Establishing Permanent Civil
Wrongful Lien Injunction were improper because: (1) they nullified a filing that was not
referenced in the Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction, and for which there was no
corroborating evidence of "wrongful lien;" and (2) they include Mr. Anderton,
individually, as a respondent.
Sage filed its Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction on June 28, 2006. [R. at
1-22.] The lower court denied the request and asked Sage to further brief the issue. [R.
at 46.] The First Notice of Lis Pendens was filed on July 13, 2006. [R. at 82.]
Subsequently, on July 17, 2006, Sage re-filed the same Petition and filed a memorandum
in support of its request. [R. at 47-76.] At the same time, Sage filed a proposed order
granting the injunction, to which a copy of the First Notice of Lis Pendens was attached.
[R. at 79-82.] Despite the fact that Sage knew that the First Notice of Lis Pendens had
already been filed, as evidenced by the fact that it is attached to the proposed order, filed
concurrently, neither the Petition nor the memorandum in support of the Petition even
mentions the First Notice of Lis Pendens. [R. at 47-76.] Thus, the record contains no
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"corroborating evidence" that the First Notice of Lis Pendens was a "wrongful lien," as
required by the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-202(e). Additionally, with regard to the
nullification of the First Notice of Lis Pendens, the Petition failed to satisfy the Act's
requirements that the Petition contain "the specific actions and dates of the actions
constituting the alleged wrongful lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-202(c). These
deficiencies were not remedied at the hearing on August 11, 2006, regarding the
propriety of the injunction. In fact, Sage never remedied these substantial deficiencies.4
This "corroborating evidence" requirement cannot be waived by the district court
under the statute. It must be satisfied. In this case, it was not satisfied. Accordingly, it
was improper under the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act for Sage to include the First
Notice of Lis Pendens in the proposed order filed that same day. [R. at 79-80.] More
importantly, it was improper for the lower court to issue the injunction, which admits that
the lien "referenced in the Petition" is not the First Notice of Lis Pendens. [R. at 80.]
The lower court perpetuated that error by granting other requests for relief based
on the original Petition, which was clearly deficient. The lower court issued, among
other things, a permanent civil wrongful lien injunction, an injunction nullifying the
Second Notice of Lis Pendens, and an order granting attorneys5 fees to Sage, all based on

Sage seeks to excuse this deficiency by arguing that it did not become aware of the
First Notice of Lis Pendens until after it filed its Petition. (Opposition Brief, p. 25.) As
set forth above, however, Sage was clearly aware that the First Notice of Lis Pendens had
been filed on July 17, 2006, when it filed the proposed Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien
Injunction. [R. at 47-82.] Accordingly, Sage was fully aware of the First Notice of Lis
Pendens when it filed its Petition for the second time with the supporting memorandum.
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the initial Petition, which was procedurally and substantively deficient. Accordingly, the
lower court's orders must be vacated entirely.
In addition to the lower court's error in nullifying the First Notice of Lis Pendens,
the court also erred in including Mr. Anderton, in his individual capacity, in the
proceedings below. Although Sage's Petition for Civil Lien Injunction names Mr.
Anderton personally, the court erred in including Mr. Anderton in the proceedings below
given that Mr. Anderton did not undertake the filing of the Notice of Interest or the two
notices of lis pendens in his individual capacity. Each of these instruments was filed only
by Prime Time. Accordingly, Mr. Anderton, in his individual capacity, was improperly
included in the proceedings below. At the very least, the lower court's rulings should be
reversed as they apply to Mr. Anderton personally.
III.

NOTICES OF INTEREST AND LIS PENDENS ARE NOT WRONGFUL
"LIENS" UNDER THE WRONGFUL LIEN INJUNCTIONS ACT.
Contrary to Sage's argument, neither the Notice of Interest nor the two lis pendens

constitute "wrongful liens" under the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act. (Opposition Brief,
pp.15, 22-25, 32-45.)5 Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-201 allows "[a]ny person who believes

In its Opposition Brief, Sage argues that the nullification of the Notice of Interest
was proper because the parties stipulated that the filing of the Notice of Interest was
improper. (Opposition Brief, pp. 16-19.) Sage even pushes this argument so far as to
assert that "the pleadings filed by Anderton and Prime Time made no argument in
opposition to the Notice of Interest being a wrongful lien..." These arguments
deliberately misinterpret both the pleadings and the arguments of the parties in this
matter. First, the Answer to Petition and Verified Counterclaim filed by Mr. Anderton
and Prime Time specifically denies that the Notice of Interest was improper. [R. at 88.]
Second, the district court did not specifically find that the parties had stipulated that the
Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien. A careful reading of the transcript of the August
(continued...)
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that he or she is the victim of a wrongful lien" to "file a verified written petition for a
civil wrongful lien injunction..." Id. The Act then defines "wrongful lien" as "a lien
made in violation of Section 76-6-503.5, and includes an instrument or document as
defined in Section 38-9-1." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-102. Accordingly, in order to be
subject to the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act, a "wrongful lien" must fall under one of
the definitions given in Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 or Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5. Sage
has failed entirely to even allege, let alone demonstrate, that the Notice of Interest or
either lis pendens falls within either definition of "wrongful lien."
Sage argues that a lis pendens is necessarily a lien because it is not specifically
excluded from the terms of the Wrongful Lien Injunctions Act. (Opposition Brief, pp.
33-38.) Essentially, Sage argues that because lis pendens are not specifically excluded,
they are specifically included. (Id.) This argument is unpersuasive given that lis pendens
do not satisfy the definition of "wrongful lien" under any of the statutory schemes cited
by Sage.
A.

The Notice of Interest and The Two Lis Pendens Were Not Wrongful
Liens Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 Because They Were Authorized
by Statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 defines "wrongful lien" as:

(...continued)

11, 2006, hearing reveals that the district court found its dialog with Prime Time's
counsel sufficiently vague on this topic that it specifically ruled on the matter and found
that the Notice of Interest was properly nullified. [R. at 969, p. 55.] It is this finding that
Prime Time claims is error. Even if the district court found that the parties stipulated that
the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien, such a finding was a clear error and should be
reversed given that the parties made no clear stipulation on the matter.
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.. .any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an
owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or
filed is not:
(a)

expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal
statute;

(b)

authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or

(c)

signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner
of the real property.

Contrary to Sage's arguments, this section does not apply to the Notice of Interest
or the two lis pendens because, pursuant to this section, a "wrongful lien" cannot be
anything that is "expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute."
Id. The Notice of Interest was specifically authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-4,
which provides that:
Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective
such interest by filing for record.. .a notice in writing, duly verified by oath,
setting forth the nature of the claim.
(Id.; see also Appellants' Brief, pp. 44-46.) Likewise, the lis pendens were specifically
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2, which provides that:
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real
property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and
the defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is
claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with
the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is
situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the
parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property
in that county affected thereby.
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(Id; see also Appellants' Brief, p. 33.) Because these instruments were "expressly
authorized by5' a "state or federal statute," they cannot be "wrongful liens" as defined in
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1. Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, % 49.
Further, the lis pendens are specifically exempt from the "wrongful lien"
definition set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1. Utah Code Arm. § 38-9-2 provides that
"[t]he provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in
accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief permitted by law." Id.
Under this section, a lis pendens cannot be a "wrongful lien" as defined by Utah Code
Ann. § 38-9-1. Eldridge, 2007 UT 243,ffl[49-50.
In Eldridge, decided just last week, this Court was asked to hold that a lis pendens
filed in connection with a legal action affecting title to real property was a "wrongful
lien." Id. This Court declined to do so finding that it would be inconsistent with "Utah
case law to look beyond the face of the complaint when filed to determine that the lis
pendens amounted to a wrongful lien." Id. at ^f 50. Likewise, in the instant matter, it was
improper for the district court to go beyond the filing of the pleadings to determine
whether the notices of lis pendens amounted to "wrongful liens." Just as in Eldridge,
Sage was required to utilize the proper statutory scheme if it wanted to remove the lis
pendens rather than relying on the summary proceedings associated with the Wrongful
Lien Injunctions Act. Id.
Because the definition of "wrongful lien" under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 cannot
be applied to this circumstance, Sage had to prove in the lower court, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Prime Time violated Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5 in order to
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prevail on its claim for a civil lien injunction. Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9a-102 and 203(2).
Sage not only failed to prove this, it failed to even allege it.
B.

The Notice of Interest and The Two Lis Pendens Were Not Wrongful
Liens Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5 Because Prime Time Had an
"Objectively Reasonable" Basis to Believe That it Had a "Present
Lawful" Interest in the Property.

Sage incorrectly argues that Prime Time and Mr. Anderton violated Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-503.5. (Opposition Brief, p. 32.) That section provides:
(2)

A person is guilty of the crime of wrongful lien if that person
knowingly makes, utters, records, or files a lien:

(a)

having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he has a present
and lawful property interest in the property or a claim on the assets;
or

(b)

if the person files the lien in violation of a civil wrongful lien
injunction pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 9a, Wrongful Lien
Injunctions.

Sage cannot allege that either the Notice of Interest or the notices of lis pendens
violated subsection 2(a). (Opposition Brief, p. 32.) In fact, it is impossible for Prime
Time to have violated subsection (2)(a) because, as a matter of law, Prime Time had an
"objectively reasonable basis to believe" it had a "present and lawful property interest" in
the Property. On October 10, 2005, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase
Contract ("REPC") under which Sage agreed to sell the Property to Prime Time.
(Appellants' Brief, Ex. 1.) The REPC gave Prime Time an interest in the Property. Bill
Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984)
("The interest of a purchaser under a real estate contract is an interest in real property.")
Prime Time had a right to enforce the REPC and to take title to, and possession of, the
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Property. Accordingly, Prime Time did not violate Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5(2)(a)
by filing the Notice of Interest and lis pendens to protect that interest.
Even if the REPC did not give Prime Time an interest in the Property, it certainly
gave Prime Time an "objectively reasonable basis" to believe that it had an interest in the
Property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5(2)(a). Therefore, even if Prime Time did not
actually have an interest in the Property, it did not violate subsection (2)(a) because it had
a reasonable basis to believe it had an interest in the Property.
Sage argues that Prime Time had no interest in the Property because it attempted
to cancel the REPC. [R. at 969, pp. 42-43.] However, Sage admits that it refused any
attempt by Prime Time to cancel the REPC and further, refused to return Prime Time's
earnest money. (Opposition Brief, pp. 4, 8.) Accordingly, Prime Time had a continuing
interest in the Property and, therefore, could not have violated subsection (2)(a).
Sage argues, instead, that Prime Time violated subsection (2)(b). (Opposition
Brief, pp. 43-45.) Prime Time did not violate subsection (2)(b) because neither the
Notice of Interest nor the lis pendens were filed "in violation of a civil wrongful lien
injunction." The Notice of Interest was filed on May 10, 2006. The First Notice of Lis
Pendens was filed on July 13, 2006. The lower court did not issue the Ex Parte Civil
Wrongful Lien Injunction until July 17, 2006. Accordingly, when the Notice of Interest
and the First Notice of Lis Pendens were filed, there was no injunction in place. The
Second Notice of Lis Pendens was not a violation of an injunction because it was
specifically authorized both by the lower court and by Sage. See section IV.B below.
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Because the Notice of Interest and the two lis pendens did not violate Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-503.5 or Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, they were each proper filings and the
lower court erred in nullifying them.6 If Sage wanted to pursue the removal of these
filings, it should have done so under the proper statutes. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 35-37.)
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COUNTERCLAIM AND THEN COMPOUNDED THAT ERROR BY
NULLIFYING THE SECOND FILED NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
A.

The District Court Erred When It Dismissed the Counterclaim.

In response to Sage's Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction, Mr. Anderton
and Prime Time filed an Answer to Petition and Verified Counterclaim.7 [R. at 87-95.]
At the August 11, 2006, hearing, the lower court improperly dismissed that Counterclaim.
[R. at 969, p 57.] As a result of its dismissal of the Counterclaim, the lower court
nullified the First Notice of Lis Pendens, finding that it did not correspond to any
properly filed complaint or counterclaim by Prime Time. [R. at 969, pp. 55-58.]
However, the district court erred in dismissing the Counterclaim and, therefore,
ultimately erred in nullifying the First Notice of Lis Pendens.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that actions brought under the parallel Wrongful
Liens and Wrongful Judgment Liens Act ("Wrongful Judgment Liens Act" (Utah Code

6

Sage incorrectly argues that any error in nullifying the Notice of Interest was
harmless because the injunction was issued based on both the Notice of Interest and the
First Notice of Lis Pendens and, therefore, would have been issued even without a
finding that the Notice of Interest was improper. (Opposition Brief, pp. 19-20.)
However, given that the First Notice of Interest was also improperly nullified, as set forth
above, the injunction did not constitute harmless error.
7

The Counterclaim was filed by Prime Time alone.
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Ann. § 38-9-1, et. seq.)) can contain claims other than for removal of a "wrongful lien."
Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, LLC, 2005 UT 59, ^ 14, 123 P.3d 292. In Anderson,
the plaintiff sought to nullify a wrongful lien and also stated a claim to quiet title to the
property at issue. Id. at ^f 2. The district court denied the petition for removal of the lien
and plaintiff appealed. Id. at If 3. The Utah Supreme Court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the district court's order was not a final judgment
given that plaintiffs quiet title claim was still pending in the lower court. Id. at ^| 17. In
so doing, the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that the Wrongful Judgment Liens
Act should be interpreted as treating a petition to nullify a wrongful lien "as a motion for
an expedited proceeding addressing one issue within the context of a larger civil action,
like a motion for partial summary judgment on the wrongful lien issue..." Id. at *\ 14.
The Court further held that this:
.. .interpretation is more consistent with the structure of the statute, which
does not explicitly prohibit the petition from containing additional claims
and, in fact, anticipates that the petition may include claims in addition to
those subject to expedition.. .It is clear that the legislature recognized that a
party may have claims beyond a request to nullify a wrongful lien. Nothing
in the statute prohibits those claims from being initially pled in a petition to
nullify. This suggests that the outcome of the summary lien proceeding
does not necessarily end the controversy between the parties.
Id. The Court also held that the district court did not have the authority to dismiss the
plaintiffs remaining claims at the hearing on the petition to nullify the lien. Id. at ^J18
("even if the district court intended to dismiss each of the claims before it, it did not have
authority to do so at the summary lien proceeding").
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Although a district court is limited to determining whether there exists a "wrongful
lien" at the hearing on a petition to nullify a "wrongful lien," the court is not limited in its
ability to make a determination of the remaining rights and interests of the parties in the
normal course. Id. at ^f 14. This proposition is further supported by Utah R. Civ. P.
13(a), which provides that:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Based on the holding in Anderson and the compulsory counterclaim rule set forth
above, Prime Time not only had the right to file the Counterclaim, it was obligated to do
so. The district court, therefore, erred in dismissing the Counterclaim. The Counterclaim
was properly before the lower court and the lower court "did not have the authority" to
dismiss the Counterclaim at the summary lien hearing. Id. at \ 18. Correspondingly, the
lower court erred in nullifying the First Notice of Lis Pendens, which was supported by
the Counterclaim. The lower court compounded these errors by first telling Prime Time
that it could file a second action seeking whatever "relief it was entitled to and then
nullifying the Second Notice of Lis Pendens filed in connection with the second action
and holding that the Second Notice of Lis Pendens was filed in violation of its previous
orders, which opened the door for a contempt proceeding.8

8

It is unclear why the district court dismissed the Counterclaim, finding that it had
no jurisdiction to hear the Counterclaim, and then reclaimed its jurisdiction the next week
to hear Sage's request to nullify the Second Notice of Lis Pendens, which was properly
(continued...)

1Q

Sage argues that the First Notice of Lis Pendens was improper because it was filed
before Prime Time filed its Counterclaim. (Opposition Brief, p. 24.) The relevant filing,
however, was the Petition, not the Counterclaim. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 provides for
the filing of a lis pendens "at the time of the filing the complaint or thereafter." Either
"party" can record a lis pendens once an action has commenced affecting title to real
property. Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243,ffl[42, 44 ("a party may first record
a lis pendens at any time after filing the complaint"). Accordingly, once the Petition was
filed, Prime Time had a right to file the First Notice of Lis Pendens.
B.

The District Court Erred in Nullifying the Second Notice of Lis
Pendens Because It Was Specifically Authorized by the District Court.

On August 11, 2006, the lower court held a hearing in this matter to determine:
(1) the propriety of the wrongful lien injunction previously entered; and (2) whether Mr.
Anderton and Prime Time had the right to file a lis pendens on the Property pending the
outcome of the disputes between the parties. [R. 969, p. 8.] At the hearing, the lower
court erred in dismissing the Counterclaim, as set forth above. During that same hearing,
however, the court, consistent with the argument of Sage's counsel, held that Mr.
Anderton and Prime Time had the right to file a separate action asserting the claims
found in the Counterclaim.
The court asked counsel for Sage whether Mr. Anderton and Prime Time were
"entitled to file a lis pendens based upon a counterclaim that they filed in [the] action.5'
(...continued)

filed in connection with an action pending before another judge. [Compare R. at 969, pp.
57-58 with R. at 970, pp. 12-21.]
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[Id. at 31.] That question prompted the following dialogue between the court and Sage's
counsel:
Mr. Morris: ... What they should have done is filed another complaint to
assert their claims...
The Court: They still can.
Mr. Morris: Yeah, they still could, that's right. But they haven't. There's
no lawsuit out there pending upon which they can properly record a lis
pendens. They can't base it on the counterclaim in this proceeding because
there should have never been a counterclaim in this proceeding.
[Id. at 31-32.] Later in the hearing, Sage's counsel stated that, if Mr. Anderton and Prime
Time thought that there was a dispute about the REPC, "the burden was on them to file a
complaint and to record a lis pendens. All right? That's what they needed to do." [Id. at
pp. 34-35.]9
In adopting the argument of Sage's counsel, the lower court held as follows:
The Court finds that the notice of interest was a wrongful lien, and a
subsequent lis pendens that did not correspond with any filing of a
complaint was also a wrongful lien, and the Court orders the removal of
both.

9

In fact, beginning as early as it's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Civil
Wrongful Lien Injunction, Sage admitted that Prime Time had the right to file a lawsuit
against it and record a lis pendens in connection with such a suit. Specifically, Sage
represented to the lower court that:
If Prime Time sought to complete the transaction and assert any real
interest in the home, it could have and should have initiated a lawsuit and
recorded a Lis Pendens."
[R. at 74.]

90

However, that does not mean that on subsequent - in any subsequent action,
my ruling is no bar to any subsequent independent action of a lawsuit
by respondent against petitioner and whomever else for all of the
alleged damages and whatever relief he wishes to do. He is not
prejudiced by my ruling; he can pursue the matter. And I'm sure that he
will consider it.
[Id. at pp. 55-58 (emphasis added).]10
It was based on the court's dismissal of the Counterclaim and the court's oral
ruling, supported by the representations of Sage's counsel, that Mr. Anderton and Prime
Time filed the subsequent action and the Second Notice of Lis Pendens. [R. at 665-667.]
Given that these actions were expressly ratified not only by the court, but also by Sage's
counsel, it is difficult to see how the lower court could justify removing that Second
Notice of Lis Pendens two days after it was filed and just five days after expressly
approving its filing.
Sage argues that the Second Notice of Lis Pendens was filed "in direct violation of
the Wrongful Lien Injunction," and "without specific permission from the court."
(Opposition Brief, pp. 32, 43-45.) To the contrary, as set forth above, the lower court
gave Mr. Anderton and Prime Time specific permission to file a separate, independent
action and the accompanying Second Notice of Lis Pendens. [R. at 969, p. 58.] By
telling Mr. Anderton and Prime Time that its "ruling is no bar to any subsequent
independent action of a lawsuit by respondent against petitioner and whomever else for
These representations by the lower court and Sage's counsel also contradict Sage's
argument that a person or entity with a legitimate interest in real property has only "one
chance" "to record a legal and proper document on [the property's] title without
permission of the court." (Opposition Brief, pp. 36.) As expressed by both the court and
Sage's counsel, there is no such thing as the "one chance rule" now advocated by Sage.
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all of the alleged damages and whatever relief ht wishes to do," that Mr. Anderton and
Prime Time were "not prejudiced by [the court's] ruling/5 and that Mr. Anderton and
Prime Time had every right to "pursue the matter/' the lower court gave Mr. Anderton
and Prime Time specific permission to file the second action against Sage and the
accompanying Second Notice of Lis Pendens. [Id]11
V.

ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT ARE CURRENTLY ON APPEAL WERE
PROPERLY PRESERVED IN THE DISTRICT COURT.
Sage argues in its Opposition Brief that Mr. Anderton and Prime Time failed to

preserve their arguments that the lower court improperly nullified the Notice of Interest
and the two lis pendens filed on the Property. (Opposition Brief, pp. 13-14.) "In order to
preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main Street v. Easy
Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004). Mr. Anderton and Prime Time satisfied this
requirement:
•

Mr. Anderton and Prime Time disputed the propriety of the Ex Parte Civil
Wrongful Lien Injunction that nullified the Notice of Interest and the First

The fact that the district court later issued an order confirming the original ex parte
injunction is also no bar to the second action or the Second Notice of Lis Pendens, as
argued by Sage. (Opposition Brief, p. 32.) First, the court's August 14, 2006, order does
not overturn its oral ruling at the August 11, 2006, hearing, in which it gave Mr.
Anderton and Prime Time permission to file the second action and the Second Notice of
Lis Pendens. Second, even if the written order did supersede the court's oral ruling, Mr.
Anderton and Prime Time were not in possession of the August 14, 2006, written order
when the second action and the Second Notice of Lis Pendens were filed. (Appellants'
Brief, pp. 25-29.) There is no evidence in the record to suggest otherwise. At most, Mr.
Anderton and Prime Time's counsel may have been made aware of the existence of the
written order. However, Mr. Anderton and Prime Time had not been notified about the
order at the time the Second Notice of Lis Pendens was filed.
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Notice of Lis Pendens and specifically requested a hearing to contest that
injunction. [R. at 83.] Subsequently, Mr. Anderton and Prime Time filed
the Answer to Petition and Verified Counterclaim in which they
specifically disputed all of the allegations contained in Sage's Petition for
injunction.
•

Mr. Anderton and Prime Time then filed a motion to dissolve the Ex Parte
Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction arguing that the injunction should be
dissolved because the First Notice of Lis Pendens was properly filed and
should not have been nullified. [R. at 103-104.]

•

During the August 11, 2006, hearing, counsel for Mr. Anderton and Prime
Time argued, at length, that no wrongful lien had been filed against the
Property and that Prime Time was entitled to maintain its First Notice of
Lis Pendens. [R. at 969, pp. 9-29.]

•

Mr. Anderton filed an Objection to Petitioner's Proposed Form of Findings
and Order on August 28, 2006, that specifically states that "Respondents
maintain that the Notice of Interest was in fact lawful." [R. at 262.]

Sage also argues that Mr. Anderton and Prime Time failed to preserve any
objection to nullification of the Second Notice of Lis Pendens. (Opposition Brief, pp. 2731.) However, Mr. Anderton and Prime Time preserved this issue for appeal in the only
way they could given that they were without representation at the August 16, 2006,
hearing, during which the lower court granted Sage's motion to remove that lis pendens.
Mr. Anderton and Prime Time made several attempts to bring their objections to this
removal to the attention of the lower court after the hearing on that matter:
•

On September 20, 2006, Mr. Anderton filed an Objection to Petitioner's
Proposed Form of Findings and Order, in which he objected to the fact that
neither he nor Prime Time had had any opportunity to contest Sage's
attempts to remove the Second Notice of Lis Pendens. [R. at 333-335.]

•

In his October 3, 2006, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay
Contempt Hearing, Mr. Anderton argued that the Second Notice of Lis
Pendens was improperly removed by the lower court given that it was
expressly authorized by the lower court and given that it was tied to a
pending matter before another judge. [R. at 400.]
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•

On October 4, 2006, Mr. Anderton requested a rehearing or amendment of
the judgment removing both of the lis pendens. [R. at 420.]

Mr. Anderton and Prime Time cannot be prejudiced by their inability to make
these arguments at the August 16, 2006, hearing given that they were deprived of
representation at the hearing. Utah R. Civ. P. 46 ("if a party has no opportunity to object
to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter
prejudice him"). Mr. Anderton and Prime Time made every effort to bring the
impropriety of the removal of the Second Notice of Lis Pendens before the Court after
their counsel withdrew without argument on the issue during the August 16, 2006,
hearing. Mr. Anderton was denied relief on each of these occasions. Accordingly, these
issues are properly before this Court on appeal.
Additionally, even if Mr. Anderton and Prime Time failed to preserve the issue
regarding the propriety of nullifying the Second Notice of Lis Pendens, they are entitled
to raise this issue on appeal under the "plain error" and "exceptional circumstances"
exceptions to the preservation rule. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 37-44.) Sage argues that Mr.
Anderton and Prime Time direct their "plain error" argument to the wrong error.
(Opposition Brief, pp. 27-28.) However, the analysis set forth in Appellants5 Brief
applies equally to the trial court's nullification of the Second Notice of Lis Pendens. The
Second Notice of Lis Pendens was properly filed pursuant to the lower court's express
permission. Accordingly, nullifying it was an error. The error should have been obvious
to the trial court given that, five days earlier, it specifically told Mr. Anderton and Prime
Time that they could file a separate action against Sage and file a lis pendens in
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connection with that action. [R. at 969, pp. 55-58.] Mr. Anderton and Prime Time were
harmed by the error because the nullification of the Second Notice of Lis Pendens
allowed Sage to sell the Property to a third party. Accordingly, Mr. Anderton and Prime
Time were unable to preserve their interest in the Property and were harmed thereby.
VI.

BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE WRONGFUL
LIEN INJUNCTION, THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES SHOULD ALSO
BE REVERSED.
The lower court awarded Sage substantial attorneys' fees and costs in association

with the injunction. [R. at 373-375.] Because the lower court erred in issuing the
injunction, the award of attorneys' fees and costs should also be reversed.
VII.

CONCLUSION.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the lower court's holdings and

likewise, reverse the award of attorneys' fees and costs to Sage.
DATED this 18th day of July 2007.

Barbara K. Polich, Esq.
Angela W. Adams, Esq.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Attorneys for Joseph D. Anderton and Prime
Time Marketing Services, Inc.
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Sage argues that Mr. Anderton and Prime Time concede that they failed to
preserve this issue in the lower court. (Opposition Brief, p. 26.) To the contrary, Mr.
Anderton and Prime Time simply argue that even if this issue was not properly preserved,
it is appealable under the "plain error" and "exceptional circumstances" doctrines.
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